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ABSTRACT One of the challenges of mobile health is to provide a way of maintaining privacy in the
access to the data. Especially, when using ICT for providing access to health services and information.
In these scenarios, it is essential to determine and verify the identity of users to ensure the security of the
network. A way of authenticating the identity of each patient, doctor or any stakeholder involved in the
process is to use a software application that analyzes the face of them through the cams integrated in their
devices. The selection of an appropriate facial authentication software application requires a fair comparison
between alternatives through a common database of face images. Users usually carry out authentication with
variations in their aspects while accessing to health services. This paper presents both 1) a database of facial
images that combines the most common variations that can happen in the participants and 2) an algorithm
that establishes different levels of access to the data based on data sensitivity levels and the accuracy of the
authentication.
INDEX TERMS Security, facial authentication, database, face images, m-health.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security on m-health services is relevant to ensure the
appropriate usage of different applications through networks.
In particular, the applications of distance services are based
on the assumption that participants correctly indicate their
identities when logining to the system. A possible way to
validate the identities of participants is to apply facial authen-
tication through the use of a webcam [1], [2]. In particular,
facial authentication has already been suggested to be used in
health and social services.
Our medical records contain a great deal of information
about Privacy, Information Technology, and Health Care [3].
These records also contain confidential information about
who and what we are—about topics such as fertility, abor-
tions, emotional problems and psychiatric care. These data
must not be disclosure and the access to the information
must be controlled. The importance of identifying patients
within m-health systems has been increasing not only for
protecting privacy but also for controlling the right access to
the service (if a fake user is not authenticated, the insurance
company could be providing the service to another person).
Typical security requirements of m-health systems should
include among others confidentiality, effective user authen-
tication and access control. Authentication is the process
of determining whether someone or something is, in fact,
who or what it is declared to be [4]. Authentication sys-
tems must ensure that the data collected are associated with
the correct participant and that only authorized individuals
have access to these data and tools. Two-factor authentica-
tion (2FA) is used by the cybersecurity community in some
cases [5]. Specially, it should be considered when sensitive
data are accessed. Some authors use as the second category
eye scans or voice recognition [6]. In our case, we work with
face recognition, establishing a three-level algorithm that
lets users access to the data depending on the authentication
accuracy.
In online health services, the authentication of patients has
become a need for preventing patients from making frauds
and ensuring that the virtual patients are who they claim to
be [7]–[9]. Therefore, each user plays an important role in
his/her care process, where (s)he must be diagnosed, iden-
tified and verified correctly [10], [11]. Nowadays, m-health
systems only provide the authentication of the user using
the username and password at the beginning of the session.
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However, during the rest of the access users are without
supervision, what can increase the susceptibility to fraud [12].
Furthermore, this type of access provokes disadvantages to
control the privacy in the access to the system. Therefore,
a solution for this disadvantage could be the use of facial
authentication systems in real time.
Jain and Nandakumar [13] assert that biometrics is one
of the methods of individual authentication. It means the
automatic recognition of a person based on their physiologi-
cal features or behavior. In comparison with other biometric
systems like the iris, fingerprint or the retina, facial authen-
tication has a better acceptance by users [14] and does not
require specialized equipment for the data acquisition.
In general, the operations of biometric systems are nor-
mally similar, and can be defined with two phases. The first
one is that the person must be registered in the system.
During the process of registration, the system captures the
characteristic feature of the person (e.g. facial image), and
it processes it to create an electronic representation called
‘‘reference model’’ or ‘‘training model’’. The training model
must be stored in a database. The second phase of the biomet-
ric system consists in recognizing the person. The user does
not inform the system what are their identity and it processes
it to create the ‘‘live model’’. After that, the biometric soft-
ware compares both models (reference model and live model)
to determine the identity of the person in the database.
Improving the security of the m-health systems is an
important requirement with the purpose of giving greater
trust to the stakeholders involved in the process: doctors,
insurance companies, patients, and so on. This aligns with
our previous works that present different ways of including
security in m-health systems. We proposed a mechanism to
include data encryption in mobile-health applications [15].
We also presented an architecture for improving security in
m-health services based on cloud storage and services [16].
In addition, we have developed m-health applications, such
as SapoFitness app [17], which monitors the weight of users
and suggests them daily exercises and some diets, in order to
reduce their obesity or keep them with a healthy life style.
The application of biometric technologies could be use-
ful for improving the security of m-health systems. How-
ever, some existing biometric authentication systems omit the
appropriate security mechanisms for some kinds of malicious
opponents. Some authors state that there is still a series of
problems that must be resolved before achieving a totally
anonymous identity in biometric authentication and the pro-
tection from some common attacks [18], [19].
In order to improve this situation, Mayron et al. [20] and
He et al. [21] proposed a series of techniques and ways to
be robust for some common kinds of attacks. Das et al. [22]
proposed a light-weight biometric-based authentication
scheme for hierarchical wireless body area networks that
prevented attacks such as denial of service, privileged insider,
and man in the middle. Ohana et al. [23] introduced
’honey faces’: the concept of adding a great group of syn-
thetic faces (indistinguishable from real) in the biometric
password file. This password protects the privacy of users
and increases the security of the system without affecting the
accuracy of the authentication.
In this line, Cherrat et al. [24] proposed a learning system
for facial authentication algorithm based on a system called
3SD ‘‘Security and Surveillance System for Drivers’’. This
system is based on intelligent sensors and cameras which
constantly monitor the vehicle environment and the driver
behavior to detect potentially dangerous situations. The learn-
ing system of face recognition facilitates the early detection
of sleep among other situations. Specifically in the field of
Mobile Healthcare (mHealth), Wazid et al. [25] carried out a
taxonomy of security protocols for mHealth systems that is
based on the supported characteristics, possible attacks, and
computation and communication costs.
Focusing on this research field, this work proposes the
design and evaluation of a database of facial images. This
database could be used to validate and ensure the precision
of different software applications for facial authentication.
Moreover, an open-source facial authentication application
called OpenFace was used in order to determine the level of
effectiveness in the identification and verification of the user.
Furthermore, we propose an algorithm to establish different
data privacy levels depending on their sensitivity.
In brief, the contribution of this work is two-fold. First,
a novel database of photos has been collected to train facial
authentication algorithms to be robust for variations in rota-
tions, distance, expressions and accessories. This can be the
basis for improving facial authentication algorithms in the
next years. Second, this work presents a proposal for includ-
ing facial authentication for conforming a 2FAmechanism for
improving the security in the access to health data in m-health
environments.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. Section II
reviews facial databases proposed in the literature. Section III
describes the details of the database ‘‘FACEIMAGES’’ that
we have created. Section IV introduces the experiments of
the presented database with an existing facial authentication
application. Section V proposes a security approach for m-
health systems. Finally, section VI outlines the conclusions
and future research lines.
II. RELATED WORKS
In the field of the biometrics and in the case of the facial
authentication, the databases of facial images have got a
relevant place, and are focused on the evaluation of different
algorithms of facial authentication. Some of the databases
cannot be considered as superior to others, since each of
them is designed to test different aspects of recognition and
consequently has their own strengths and weaknesses.
One of the biggest databases was FERET with 1,199 par-
ticipants with a maximum of 20 poses per user, considering
two different expressions and two different lighting condi-
tions [26]. Others, for example, are focused specifically on
the variation of the capture conditions of the pose and the
lighting [27].
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TABLE 1. Specfic features of the OST relevant facial image databases.
For instance, Du [28] decided to use three databases.
(1) 896 images of 126 people of the database AR Face
Database [29]; (2) 600 images of the databaseM2VTS (Multi
Modal Verification for Teleservices and Security applica-
tions) [30], and (3) 530 images of facial expressions of the
American sign language.
At the same level, Lin [31], decided to use photographs
of two databases already existing: on one hand, the database
of Olivetti Research Laboratory (ORL), and on the other
hand, the database of facial detection of NCKU (National
Cheng Kung University). The ORL database contains pic-
tures that have been taken under some controlled lighting
conditions and background. The size of all these pictures is
92 × 112 pixels, with 256 levels in the gray scale for each
pixel. NCKU database contains 660 different pictures of
90 people. These databases used five different images with
the same type of lighting, different facial expressions, and
twirls on the face. As a characteristic feature, these databases
used a gray scale of color in their pictures.
Furthermore, Zou et al. [32] used two databases already
created in their experiments: on one hand, the CASPEAL
database contains 99,594 pictures of 1,040 people with dif-
ferent poses, expressions, accessories and lighting [33] and
on the other hand, the database YALEB, with images of
10 people with 63 different types of lighting [34].
However, most of the existing databases have different
limitations, like the amount of images per person. Normally,
researches opt to create databases with lots of people, but
the number of images of each person is low. By contrast,
Min et al. [35] created a new database of photographs
(KINECTFACE)with a sample of 52 users, using ameta-data
file, with different information data about the participants,
like for example: (1) the gender information; (2) year of
birth; (3) with or without glasses. The authors state that all
the images were taken under the same conditions, but there
are not restrictions on clothes, make-up or hairstyle of the
participants. Among other conditions taken into account to
capture the photographs, they decided to put a white board
behind each user with a distance of 1.25m, with the purpose
of producing a simple background, which it can be filtered
easily.
In this line, Conde et al. [36] built a database with 2D and
3D images with metadata, which was called FRAV2D [37].
In its first version, a group of 51 subjects were scanned with
14 different captures of images per subject, depending on the
type of rotation and lighting. The total of captures of images
was 714. Later, the database was made with 105 people with
16 different captures per person: four front images, eight
different rotations with different directions and grades, two
gestures and two different lighting conditions. The partici-
pants were chosen between students, teachers and staff who
worked at university.
Moreover, other authors have investigated about the reso-
lution of the photographs that the database must have, with
the purpose of achieving a successful facial recognition. For
instance, Farshchi et al. [38], carried out different analyses
about the average time for detecting a user in the picture with
different types of resolutions. The results showed that for a
resolution of 460 × 680, the average time of detection was
0.8s; for a resolution of 800 × 600, the average time was
0.9s; for a resolution of 1,024 × 768, the average time
was 1s; and for a resolution of 1,152 × 864, the average
timewas 1.2s. The average level of authenticationwas 92,7%.
With the purpose of classifying the characteristics and options
that each database offers, table 1 determines the most relevant
features of the aforementioned databases.
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A. FACIAL AUTHENTICATION VS. OTHER
BIOMETRIC METHODS
While some biometric methods can require certain volun-
tary action from the patient, the facial authentication can be
used passively. Braz et al. [39] compared different biometric
methods, including the facial authentication, fingerprint and
iris. Lassmann [40] performed different field tests about these
methods and determined that the fingerprint recognition was
the most used, followed by the iris detection and the facial
recognition. However, some of these methods present some
deficiencies in comparison with facial authentication.
Regarding the data acquisition, it is easier to obtain high
quality facial images than appropriate fingerprints. For exam-
ple, there are some disadvantages when using the recognition
through fingerprints. Some of those reasons include cut skin,
bandaged fingers, callosity, dry or wet skin, use of moisturiz-
ing creams, sweat and transmission of germs [41], [42].
The iris scanner can provide a high effectiveness for the
recognition of users, however, due to the iris is quite small,
it needs a high-resolution camera in order to be able to be
captured. Furthermore, the camera should be close in order to
capture the iris and all this process is highly sensitive to the
body movements [43]. These systems can fail when contact
lenses are used, or when blinking at the time of taking the
image. Moreover, there is a range of ocular diseases that
affect the capacity of the iris recognition system to capture
the proper image of the eye [44].
By contrast, a system about facial authentication only
requires the front camera of a smartphone and without the
need of a specialized equipment, because the field of view
of the webcam is big enough to cover the range of facial
faces of people [45]. The perception of a user about the
usability of a biometric method is also an important factor.
Jain et al. [46] highlighted the facial authentication as one
of the best biometric methods which was thought to have a
‘‘high’’ acceptance from users, while the digital fingerprint
recognition was thought to have a ‘‘medium’’ acceptance
from users. Table 2 presents levels of accuracies of some
of the existing research works about these three biometric
methods.
Taking into consideration the results and conclusions
from the different research works analyzed and compared,
the facial authentication systems are presented as a possible
alternative for the identification of patients with great results
in accuracy, being a non-intrusive method and with the ease
of data acquisition since nowadays most users have smart-
phones, normally with front cameras.
III. FACEIMAGES DATABASE
The design of a database for the facial authentication is a com-
plex task, due to the big amount of factors that influence the
conditions while getting the data. For this reason, a protocol
is required to ensure that all the images of the people are
comparable. A proof of this complexity is the large variety
of existing two-dimensional facial databases and the absence
of homogeneity between them [59], [60].
TABLE 2. Accuracies of some research works of three different biometric
methods.
In this work, we present a database as an addition to the rest
of the existing facial databases, taking into account a novel
set of combinations of characteristics of each of them, and
deepening in those aspects that were not used by them and can
also be useful for the facial identification and authentication.
We have designed a database called ‘‘FACEIMAGES’’, and
sections A and B respectively present its characteristics and
structure.
The sample of participants of the database was composed
of 23 potential users of m-health systems, who have signed
an agreement to allow the use of their photos for creating
FACEIMAGES and later on performing their corresponding
biometric analysis.
Data security and privacy protection are two main fac-
tors that need to be taken into account for our database.
In order to get it, some authors recommend different tips
to avoid possible attacks [61], [62], [63]. For example,
some researchers highlight the need for a dynamic security
model and cryptographic algorithms that point to different
levels of security and privacy for cloud computing [64].
Lodha and Dhande [65] and Akanji et al. [66] proposed to
eliminate the threats of the system by some advices such
as encryption, user identification, and access control, which
ensure that all communications with databases and other




In order to capture images of the participants with differ-
ent poses, expressions, accessories and lighting conditions,
we used a cam with a resolution in pixels of 630 × 475.
Figures 1 and 2 show two examples of the different ways
of capturing images in relation to the rotation of the
face (25 degrees at rotation angles).
2) ACCESSORIES
In the facial authentication process, the use of accessories as
glasses, hats, caps of scarves could cause great difficulties for
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FIGURE 1. Example of how images have been taken with different face rotations.
FIGURE 2. Example of face participant rotation. Images taken from the FACEIMAGES database. (a) right position, (b) frontal position, (c) left position.
FIGURE 3. Example of a user images taken from FACEIMAGES database with different accessories: (a) wearing a scarf, (b) wearing
a cap, and (c) wearing glasses.
face detection, because they could sometimes provoke facial
occlusion. In this work, we have carefully used different types
of accessories with the purpose of increasing the diversity of
our database. With regards to glasses, the database used two
types: normal glasses and sunglasses. It also used different
hats or caps with different sizes and shapes. In addition,
it considered either wearing a scarf or not. Figure 3 shows
some examples of these kinds of variations.
3) FACIAL EXPRESSIONS
In order to capture the images, we took four types of facial
expressions into consideration. Apart from the neutral expres-
sion, the participants were asked to show other three types
of expressions: (a) smiling, (b) shouting and (c) closing the
eyes, and opening the mouth (see examples in Figure 4).
Friendly patients may smile while contacting through
m-health services. The second type of expression could hap-
pen if the patient is in great pain. The last type of expression
was carried out to consider emergency demands during the
night, when they can be tired and sleepy. Different distances
from the webcam
Other factor to take into consideration is that the participant
is located in a correct distance from the camera. Thinking
about this problem in the facial authentication, we have col-
lected some images of the participants with different dis-
tances. Two distances were used: 0.5 and 1 m. Examples of
these pictures are presented in Figure 5.
B. STRUCTURE OF THE DATABASE
A database of facial images must include different variations
in order to try how reliable the algorithm of the software
of facial authentication is in different conditions. Due to
this, thirty variations were used in order to build our facial
database. Table 3 shows all the combinations considered in
this database for each participant.
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FIGURE 4. Example of a user images taken from FACEIMAGES database with different facial expressions: (a) smile, (b) scream,
and (c) yawn.
TABLE 3. Combination of features of face images in the database faceimages.
FIGURE 5. Example of a user images taken from FACEIMAGES database
with different distances from the webcam: (a) close, and (b) far.
IV. RELIABILITY OF OPENFACE MEASURED WITH
THE DATABASE FACEIMAGES
Nowadays, OpenFace is one of the most popular free appli-
cations for facial authentication. Amoset al. [67] have been
the creators of OpenFace through Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity (CMU) under the license of Apache 2.0. OpenFace is an
open-source based project in a researching project of Google.
Baltrušaitis et al. [68] explain that it is necessary to intro-
duce the information of each person in OpenFace previously
(name and a minimum of ten pictures of the person) so that
OpenFace could learn how to distinguish each person in base
of their features. In this way, once the information of several
people is introduced, the system is able to find out who is who
in real time.
It is worth mentioning that the same database of images
should be used for comparing several tools in order to ensure
the reliability of comparisons. For this reason, we have cre-
ated our own facial database, so it could be used in the
identification and facial verification of any experiment.
In general terms, a system of biometric identification uses
any of the physiological characteristics to identify a person,
in our case, the face of a person. In the classifying tools,
we could distinguish different types of percentages which
determine its quality. Specifically, these parameters could
be applied to the systems of facial authentication. Due to
this fact, it is defined as (1) true positive (TP), the images
where the right user appeared in the picture and the system
identified him correctly, as (2) false positive (FP), the photos
where a false user appeared and the system authenticated
him erroneously, as (3) true negative (TN) where there was
another false user and the system detected the usurpation
effectively and (4) false negative (FN) where there was the
right user but the system detected a usurpation.
For our analysis, we have used different measures:
(1) sensitivity, the percentage of times that the user was
authenticated correctly in the true cases; (2) specificity,
percentage of cases which the system detected usurpations
in the false cases; and (3) accuracy, the percentage of
times that the system provided a correct result in all the
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TABLE 4. Percentages obtained in relation to the face rotation.
TABLE 5. Percentages obtained in reltion to different facial expressions.
TABLE 6. Percentages obtained in relation to different accessories.
possible cases. In some cases, OpenFace was not able to
detect a face in the image, so it outputted an error mes-
sage without classifying the image. We reported this fact
by indicating the percentages of images that OpenFace was
able to analyze in each case (denoted as ‘‘analyzed’’ in the
corresponding tables).
In tables 4 to 6, one can observe the different features
obtained taking into consideration the different combinations
of our database. All these tables consider two values related
to the distance fromwhere the pictures were taken (close-far).
With regards to face rotation, in the table 4 we could
highlight how OpenFace presents a higher percentage of
sensitivity in right rotation of the face than in the left rota-
tion, both in close and far distance (100 against 88.89, and
100 against 85.00 respectively). However, OpenFace has a
higher level of accuracy in the left rotations than in the right
rotations, although both percentages are very close for both
distances (between 85 and 90%).
With regards to the facial expressions, it could be observed
in table 5 how the biometric software has percentages of
sensitivity and ability of analyzing close or the same as 100%
for close distances, although for far distances the sensitivity
has a percentage much lower in the photos with yawn expres-
sion face. With regards to the level of accuracy of OpenFace
for all kind of expressions and for both distances, all levels
showed results around 74-85% approximately.
Taking the accessories into consideration, in table 6 we
can do several analyses. For example, in relation to the level
of accuracy, it is observed that if the user wears a cap or a
scarf, the level of accuracy is higher in far distances than
in close distances for both rotations (percentages between
83% and 91%). However, if the user wears glasses, the level
of accuracy is slightly better in close distance than far dis-
tance. Also, the lowest accuracy is experimented if the user is
situated far to the webcam, his face is rotated to the left, and
he wore glasses.
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TABLE 7. Means obtained in relation to differet measurement values.
Table 7 shows the average of the four measures. It is worth
indicating that OpenFace detects better TP than FN. However,
the accuracy of this system is close to 80%, which is an
appropriate level for this kind of system.
V. SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE ACCESS TO
THE HEALTH DATA
This work presents a security system for the access of health
data. Section A presents the security model of this system.
Section B introduces the mechanisms to access the data
regarding three different levels of data. Section C integrates
the use of FACEIMAGES in this proposal, and discusses
some illustrative examples.
A. Security model
The confidentiality and invasion of privacy are two aspects of
great importance when working in health-related scenarios.
The CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
is at the heart of information security. Among these aspects,
we center our study in the proposal of a protocol to maintain
data confidentiality and user’s privacy, considering attacks
similar to the ones proposed by Simoens et al. [18]. Our
protocol uses a two-factor authentication that allows autho-
rized users to access to the data. Also, a privacy algorithm is
presented in the next subsection in order to protect sensitive
data with a strongest level of authentication
The proposed protocol establishes three phases in the
authentication process. In the first one, the user must be
physically identified. Therefore, the user goes physically to
the place where the identification and user register are done.
Once the user has been physically identified, an account is
created for that user. This account registers among others the
following user’s data: user’s identification id, personal data
such as telephone number, first level authentication user’s
data (user and password), and second level authentication
user’s data (facial images with variations). The ‘‘necessary
photos’’ for following authentications are taken physically by
the system. This protocol step can be viewed in Figure 6.
When the user’s account has already been created, they can
send new facial variations of them using the online system,
always after going through the three phases protocol and with
a right strong authentication process.
The second phase is carried out by the user when they want
to access to their data or health-services. In this moment,
a 2FA process begins. In order to exchange the authentication
first level user’s data, a session key is established. In our
protocol, the server must own a server’s certificate certified
FIGURE 6. Initial physical authentication.
by approved entities of recognized prestige. That certificate
is sent to the client. The client verifies server’s identity and
generates the session key. The session key is cyphered by the
public server’s key and sent to the server. From this moment,
all communications among server and client are cyphered
with this key. One this process has been carried out, the user
will send their first level authentication data, that is, user
and password. This process can be observed in Figure 7.
If the process is right, the second authentication level process
begins.
In the third phase, the second level authentication process
is done. In order to provide a strong authentication system,
this asks the user to validate two different facial images
variations (example: right position and left position). These
variations are analyzed with the biometrical model of the user
stored in the database. The user may change a variation to
validate, only if this involves accessories (for example they
do not wear glasses in that authentication and want to try
another variation). If the value of the comparison of one photo
with the database is higher than an ‘x’ threshold and the
other one is at least above a ‘‘z’’ threshold then, access to
level 2 data is provided for that user. If the level is higher
than the ‘y’ threshold for one photo an at least above a ‘‘w’’
threshold, the system grants access to level 1 data. Thresholds
x, y, w and z can be calibrated after the system is deployed
and tested with some users. Figure 8 shows the process of
this third phase. The data levels are introduced in the next
subsection.
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FIGURE 7. First level of logical authentication.
FIGURE 8. Second level of logical authentication.
Our system is protected from attacks based on insufficient
authentication. For that purpose, it denies the access to sen-
sitive content or functions depending on the authentication
result. Also, if the authentication is not valid in three tries the
system blocks the possibility of new tries. In this case, in order
to protect the system against brute force attack, we propose
a protocol similar to the user with credit cards. The user
will receive an alert informing them, as ‘‘some illicit’’ access
could have been tried in their name. Then, the user could call
to the medical center or access to their online account to take
the proper measures to avoid illegal access and to protect their
privacy.
Moreover, in order to protect the system against weak
password recovery validation, we established a protocol of
challenges based on two rounds. The first round is a list of
questions that the user registered when creating their account
and profile, the second round of challenges is based on a facial
image authentication, where some variations are proposed to
the user in order to validate at least two different profiles.
In that way, again, a two-factor validation process is estab-
lished in order to recover the password.
Privacy and integrity in the transmission are guaranteed by
both using a hash function generated over the transmitted data
and using symmetric cryptography to protect the data sent.
In this way, some of the attacks against which the system is
protected are (1) eavesdropping, as the data are cyphered;
(2) data modification, identity spoofing and password-
based attacks, as the system uses strong authentication;
(3) denial of service, considering that only three consec-
utive authentications are allowed; (4) man in the middle,
through the use of server’s certificate and strong authentica-
tion process; (5) compromised key attack as the session key is
re-generated in each connection, and (6) sniffer attack, since
the data are protected. Strong cyphered algorithms are used
in order to avoid attacks based on algorithms’ weaknesses.
The current approach stores all the images in a secure way.
For this purpose, the PNG photo files are encrypted with
the mechanism proposed by Yuang et al. [69]. Notice that
with this mechanism, the faces cannot be recognized in the
photo files after the corresponding encryption. The decryp-
tion requires multiple keys that are sent in different mes-
sages. Users registers its initial true images double-checked
by human in a face-to-face meeting in which the use shows its
national identity card. These images are stored in the server
of the health center, and then these photos are transferred
to another server that actually checks the access of users.
In this way, the original photos are duplicated in two different
servers in case some errors happen. The transmission from
server to server is performed following the approach intro-
duced by Boopathi et al. [70], whose authors demonstrated its
robustness against collision attack, the chosen prefix collision
attack, and the plaintext attack.
B. SECURITY LEVELS FOR DIFFERENT KINDS OF DATA
In order to maintain users’ privacy in the access to the health
system services and information, and depending on the accu-
racy of the authentication we have designed an algorithm in
which personal data access is established based on several
levels. When accessing to health data, our approach performs
a strong authentication process. We define strong authenti-
cation as a way to ensure that each person who identifies
themselves in a system is actually who they claim to be by,
verifying their identity in an accurate way [5]. Among the
three ways of identifying the users: (a) something the person
know, (b) something the person own and (c) something that
the person is, we have selected two authentication processes
corresponding to (a) and (c) factors. In our proposal, any
system’s user must carry out at least an identification based
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on the introduction and validation of user/password data.
Moreover, if they require to access to more sensitive data,
a facial authentication must be carried out.
In our model, data are classified depending on their sen-
sitivity. We establish three levels. In order to determine the
sensitivity of the data, we have studied the Spanish organic
law on the protection of personal data [71]. From the study
carried out, we have selected and classified the different types
of health data and those that can be treated within a public
health system into the following levels:
Level 1 Data:
• Data related with ideology, health or sexual life that are
not possible to be including in the level 3.
• Data arising from acts of gender-based violence.
Level 2 Data:
• Data that offer a definition of the personality and allow
evaluating certain aspects of it or related with people
behavior.
Level 3 Data:
• Data that are used for the sole purpose of making a
money transfer to entities, in which the person is an
associate or a member.
• Data containing health data, which refers exclusively
to the degree or condition of disability or the simple
declaration of invalidity, due to the fulfillment of public
duties.
Both patients and doctors or any person involved in the
health process that need to access to the data and ser-
vices, is authenticated in order to set the proper permis-
sions. Authentication made by user and password data allows
access to level 3 data. To access 1 or 2 levels data, a second
authentication is required. This second authentication level
implies a facial authentication. In this way, the authentication
requirements are the following ones:
Privacy level 1 and 2: password and facial authentication.
Privacy level 3: password authentication
Figure 9 shows the diagram about the process of authenti-
cation, in which the following terms have been used:
Pu1 (t): password authentication of user u1 in a time t
Fu1 (t): facial authentication of user u1 in a time t
As we have shown in previous sections and due to the
different user’s variations in the process, different results can
be obtained from performing a facial authentication. The
current approach considers that a robust m-health system
should provide an appropriate accuracy in the authentication
for accessing the data of the different levels, considering
different combinations of circumstances. For this purpose,
we have presented a database of facial images that can assist
designers of m-health systems in developing or selecting an
appropriate facial authentication application.
C. INTEGRATION OF FACEIMAGES IN THE SECURITY
SYSTEM FOR m-HEALTH AND ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
A different target threshold can be established for each of the
first two data levels. As an example, we respectively propose
FIGURE 9. Process of authentication.
FIGURE 10. Access allowed when working in close-distance scenarios,
with different accessories and rotations.
the following thresholds of accuracy for the second and first
levels of security: x = 65% and y = 80%.
Figures 10 and 11 respectively present these thresholds
in the charts of the average results of OpenFace application
with the proposed FACEIMAGES database, in the different
scenarios. More concretely, figure 10 presents the average
results for some close-distance scenarios, and figure 11 does
it for some far-distance scenarios, in both cases considering
different rotations and accessories.
In order to better illustrate the application of the current
approach, we illustrate the whole process with an example.
When a private or public health organization has decided
to integrate m-health on their services, a system must be
developed and deployed for providing this service. One of the
VOLUME 5, 2017 22539
F. D. Guillén-Gámez et al.: Proposal to Improve the Authentication Process in m-Health Environments
FIGURE 11. Access allowed when working in far-distance scenarios, with
different accessories and rotations.
crucial aspects is to ensure the authentication security due to
the high levels of confidentiality of their data. In this case, this
work proposes a 2FA system, in which the second authentica-
tion mechanism is based on facial photographs taken from the
cam of the correspondingmobile device. However, the system
is recommended to be robust regardless of hindering aspects
such as different rotations, expressions, accessories and dis-
tances. The engineer of the m-health system can assess the
quality of the facial authentication application in all these pos-
sible scenarios with the proposed FACEIMAGES database.
When the m-health system has been deployed, patients can
start using it. First, they should register and provide some
true face images for creating the reference model. Then, each
time the user accesses, it introduces their user and password
data, and show their face to the cam of their mobile device.
The system takes a picture and analyzes it for granting access.
In some cases, the system may need to take several pictures
to decide whether to grant access, generally if the conditions
are different from the ones in which the reference images
were taken. If the systemworks properly, it will grant the user
with access to the three levels. If there are some mismatches,
the system may need more time for granting the user with
access to the data of the highest level of security (i.e. level 1).
If the system detects an attempt of usurpation after analyzing
an enough large number of pictures, the system will alert the
administrator and/or the real user so they can take the proper
actions.
In order to show the effectiveness of this example,
we simulated two different new scenarios. In the first sce-
nario, a person accessed the system adopting different dis-
tances, accessories, rotations and expressions. We logged
this user with two different usernames. The first username
was used when he was not wearing accessories. The second
username was used when he had some accessories on
(i.e. cap, sun glasses, and scarf). OpenFace provided the
FIGURE 12. The t-SNE chart of the same user logged with two different
usernames (the latter used when wearing accessories).
FIGURE 13. The t-SNE chart of two different users.
t-SNE (t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding) chart
of Figure 12 for these two usernames. T-SNE is the dimen-
sionality reduction technique that OpenFace uses to visualize
the 128 dimensional features it analyzes. As one can observe,
the system did not distinguish between the two usernames,
as both belonged to the same person.
In the second scenario, we logged into the system two
different users with different usernames. Both subjects were
male and were close relatives (i.e. brothers). This may be
a difficult scenario for the proper classification, since close
relatives may have facial similarities. In addition, the system
analyzed pictures of them, with different rotations, distances,
accessories and expressions. OpenFace provided the t-SNE
chart of Figure 13. One can observe that even for this sce-
nario, the system properly classified most of the pictures. The
spatial results of these different users were mostly allocated
in different areas.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In online systems, security can be compromised by either
web attackers and network attackers. Each security system
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can suffer different kinds of attacks regarding its type. The
current approach is composed of two factors of authentica-
tion, the encrypted password and facial authentication. Since
we use known encryption algorithms already validated, this
discussion focuses on the possible attacks related with the
facial authentication.
In facial authentication, the most relevant attack is the
stealing of facial images. For example, a network attacker
could try to intercept a facial image for later using it in the
authentication. The presented system is secured from this
attack in the following ways:
- The face images are encrypted to be sent through the
network, so the stealer cannot intercept these during the
network communication, as it would need to break the secure
encryption algorithm.
- Even if the stealer could steal a facial image, the proposed
authentication process could ask the user to adopt several
specific poses from a large set. In other words, the proposed
facial authenticationmechanism could use different combina-
tion of poses as partial solutions, and then the stealer cannot
enter by just stealing one of these partial solutions.
- The system can check whether the images are exactly
the same from the one previously received, and only grant
access to the new facial images different from the ones pre-
viously received. Normally, two real images are not usually
exactly the same, as these normally vary. This approach is
similar to detection of fake written signatures by assessing
their duplicity. In this manner, the system needs to take a
new original photo from the user each time. In this way, it
prevents from the attack of intercepting and reusing stolen
images.
Another possible attack is the extraction of facial images
from social media and social networks. From this attack,
the system can be protected with the following mechanisms:
- The user can upload a set of forbidden images. In case
that the system detected any of these images, it would alert
immediately the user. In this way, the user can upload all the
images that they use in their social networks or appear in the
social media.
- The previous mechanism could be compromised if for
example a friend uploads an image of the user to a social
network without him/her knowing, or simply the user forgets
to upload certain images. For protecting from these situations,
the system could incorporate an automatic search engine that
searches for facial images of the user online and includes all
these images in the list of forbidden images.
- In this kind of attack, the attacker would also need a
complete set of different poses, since the system can ask for
different poses, and the aforementioned mechanism of partial
access solution would also increase the security.
- In all the wrong attempts, the system notifies the user
so that they are aware of the these to take further security
measures (e.g. resetting the password and updating the list of
forbidden images).
Furthermore, the system includes the following protection
mechanism for the illegitimate use of facial images:
- The user app only admits photos directly taken from the
camera device for the authentication. Thus, for attempting to
any of the two aforementioned kinds of attacks, the attacker
would need to hijack the app, for being possible to correctly
send images that are not directly taken from the camera of the
device.
Finally, it is worth reminding that the system uses 2FA,
so for entering the system, the attacker would need to break
not only the aforementioned facial authentication protection
mechanisms but also the encrypted password-based validated
authentication.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
On the whole, the current work has presented a database
of facial images for testing and comparing facial software
applications and algorithms. This database has focused on
the common variations of face images taken from potential
patients. In particular, it considers different combinations of
features such as the distance to the camera, the rotation,
the different facial expressions (e.g. yawning) and acces-
sories (e.g. scarf and glasses). This particular set of combina-
tions is novel to the best of authors’ knowledge in comparison
to the existing databases of facial images. The current work
has used this facial database to propose a secure approach
for m-health systems. This approach incorporates a security
model considering some of the most common attacks. This
approach establishes different security levels for allowing
patients to access to the health data based on data sensitivity
levels.
This database was initially designed for comparing facial
authentication applications for security in m-health envi-
ronments. However, this database can be used for compar-
ing this kind of applications for different purposes, such
as (1) the customization of mobile applications regarding
the user facially identified by the camera, and (2) the anal-
ysis of the trust models of cameras of mobile devices.
This facial database is planned to be applied to compare
a large set of facial authentication applications to deter-
mine which can be the most appropriate one for each
domain.
In the future, the current work is planned to be extended in
several ways. First, the proposed database of facial images
is planned to be used to test 2FA mechanisms with facial
authentication in the internet of things, for making the com-
munication of certain kinds of health data more secure in this
context. In the long-term, we also plan to add facial recogni-
tions of emotions in the presented health access system. This
can be useful for doctors to track the emotional evolution of
their patients to detect side effects of some treatments from
the psychological viewpoint and to knowwhether the patients
may need psychological support. Furthermore, the database
of facial images will be extended to include images with very
low resolutions. In this way, the database will be useful for
assessing the accuracy of facial authentication algorithms in
analyzing images from very low-end and old devices, which
are common in the developing world.
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